This paper evaluates a program of subsidies for Collaborative Industrial Research (co-) funded by the EU Cohesion Policy in Italy mobilizing over 1 billion euros. This program anticipated in the 2007-2013 funding cycle some of the key features of Smart Specialization Strategy (S3) programmes, offering evidence-based insights on potential challenges to the practical application of the S3 approach. The programme was not successful in boosting investments, value added or employment of beneficiary firms. The collaborative dimension of the projects added limited value and a more generous level funding would have not improved effectiveness. However, positive impacts emerged in low tech sectors.
Introduction
The Smart Specialisation Strategy (usually referred to as S3) is a novel approach to the design and implementation of innovation policies. The Smart Specialisation concept emerged from the Knowledge for Growth expert group in the framework of the European Research Area (ERA) (Foray et al., 2009 ) as a means to explain the productivity gap between the US and Europe in terms of the differential penetration of Information and Communication Technologies in the two Continents. According to Foray et al. (2011) , Smart Specialisation is "… largely about the policy process to select and prioritise fields or areas where a cluster of activities should be developed, and to let entrepreneurs discover the right domains of future specialisation" (p. 7). The S3 approach advocates the concentration of public resources in a set of clearly defined pre-determined priority areas to be selected with a bottom-up approach based on a process of 'entrepreneurial discovery 1 ' involving all relevant local stakeholders that together should cooperatively elaborate the best possible innovation strategy for their own developmental future. In this framework, each individual locality is supposed to embark in "a rigorous self-assessment of [its] knowledge assets, capabilities and competences and the key players between whom knowledge is transferred" (McCann, Ortega-Argiles, 2015, p. 3) . representing an unprecedented shift from pre-existing innovation policies.
The evolution of EU innovation and Cohesion policies towards a Smart Specialisation approach was so rapid that it allowed very limited room for small-scale trialing of programme inspired by the proposed paradigm or for policy learning before large scale implementation.
The new practices and procedures established in the 2014-2020 programming period lack a wide evidence basis on their effectiveness and value added (for example in comparison with 1 This process involves the search activities by entrepreneurs that identify the potential advantages of general purpose technologies in their own economic domain, as "entrepreneurs …. are in the best position to discover the domains of R&D and innovation in which a region is likely to excel given its existing capabilities and productive assets" (Foray et al.,2011, p. 7) . local 'entrepreneurial discovery' process); b) the programme funded only specific preselected highly innovative ('smart') sectors; c) it aimed at stimulating collaboration between firms and among firms and Universities; d) it met transparency criteria for both the selection of projects to be financed (judged by independent committees) and their monitoring during implementation. Thanks to the scoring system that assigned CIR funding to individual applicant firms, it is possible to assess the impact of the program by means of state-of-the-art counterfactual methods. In particular, we compare firm performance within a bandwidth of the scoring threshold using Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) techniques. We can evaluate the impact of the programme in terms of first-order effects on investments and second-order effects in terms of value added and employment. We also analyse the extent to which the specific 'S3-style' features of this program influence effectiveness. Finally, we provide far-from-the-threshold inference, by using the Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) conditional independence assumption (CIA). We are therefore able to predict what would have happened if firms with scores below the funding threshold (and therefore not funded)
would have gained access to the scheme by virtue of a more generous funding of the programme. We can also predict whether -instead -public funds captured by firms whose scores were marginally above the funding threshold paid off or not, shedding light on the link between the scale of funding and impacts.
The empirical results offer a mixed picture. CIR did not produce any impact on the performance of the beneficiary firms in terms of investments, value added and employment.
The results suggest that a more (or less) generous level funding of the programme would have not improved its effectiveness. The findings offer limited support for the practical benefits from the collaborative dimension of the projects or for the inclusion of research centres in the project partnerships. Conversely, the programme was more successful in supporting firms in low tech sectors, suggesting that these might be viable targets for wellbalanced S3 programmes. Finally, the effectiveness of the scheme on value added (investment) is higher (lower) for firms with high patenting capacity, while there seems to be scant support for the idea that multinational corporations are key to successful innovative collaborations. These findings provide helpful insights on how to maximise the impacts of programmes inspired by the S3 strategy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature in order to highlight the key gaps. Section 3 discusses the characteristic of the CIR programme and its points of contact with programmes currently being implemented under the S3 approach. Section 4 illustrates the data. Section 5 describes the identification strategy. The results are illustrated in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes with some reflections for post-2020 innovation and Cohesion policies.
The implementation of the Smart Specialisation Strategy: key knowledge gaps
The 'Lisbon Agenda' (European Commission 2000) aimed at making the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" 'smart specialisation' as a means to 'address the grand challenge' (Foray et al. 2009 ).
"The question is whether there is a better alternative to a policy that spreads [R&D investment] thinly cross several frontier technology research fields, some in biotechnology, some in information technology, some in the several branches of nanotechnology, and, as a consequence, not making much of an impact in any one area. A more promising strategy appears to be to encourage investment in programs that will complement the country's other productive assets to create future domestic capability and interregional comparative advantage. We have termed this strategy 'smart specialisation'." (Foray et al. 2009, p.20) .
'Smart specialisation' strategies posit that entrepreneurs should be supported in their search for the most promising technological sector to better target their investments. The 'Smart specialisation' is one of the key pillars of the EU2020 Strategy and its objectives to promote "smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion" (European Commission 2010, p.5). In particular the 'smart specialisation' pillar includes three 'flagship' initiatives largely reflecting the priorities of the 'smart specialisation strategy': 'Innovation Europe' (focused on R&D), 'Youth on the move' (focusing on Human Capital) and 'A digital Agenda for Europe' (targeting ICT). All EU policies should be designed in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU2020 strategy targets.
EU Cohesion Policy has fully internalised the Smart Specialisation approach (European Commission, 2010) by aiming to identify the optimal regional-level matching between innovation efforts, human capital and local industrial and technological advantages (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015) . "The geography of innovation is very diverse with certain regions competing worldwide on the technological frontier, and others struggling to move closer to that frontier", (European Commission, 2010 p. 3). However, the architecture of the 'new' 2014-2020 EU Cohesion Policy rests on the assumption that the 'smart specialisation' principles are applicable to all regions: "Innovation is important for all regions; for advanced ones to remain ahead and lagging ones to catch up" (European Commission, 2010 p.3). The process of 'entrepreneurial discovery' triggered by the Strategy is supposed to generate structural change through the inclusive process of stakeholder involvement and to make new activities (rather than sectors or individual firms) the core priorities (Foray, 2015; Morgan, 2016) . Therefore, S3 requires stakeholders to have a global perspective on their potential competitive advantage, to be aware of their potential for cooperation, and to focus their efforts and resources on a limited number of ambitious realistic priorities through which creating a critical mass of research and development activities, leading to structural change and growth (Radosevic et al., 2017) . S3 is therefore expected to allow EU countries and regions to 'strengthen their research and innovation systems, maximise knowledge flows, improve absorption and utilisation capacities as well as spread the benefits of innovation throughout their economies' (Hegyi and Rakhmatullin, 2017, p. 5) .
Coherently with this approach the European Commission presents all EU regions with a portfolio of tools inspired by the Smart Specialisation approach to be selected, combined and coordinated in line with local needs: innovation clusters, innovation-friendly environment for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), life-long learning in research and innovation, regional research infrastructure and centres of competence, creativity and cultural industries, fast internet applications and easy access to on line contents, and the use of public procurement to support demand for innovative products and services.
What is the evidence on the impact of the innovation policy tools implemented so far by the EU regions? A recent comprehensive review 2 of impact evaluation analyses of publicly funded programmes supporting innovation highlighted that only 17 out of 42 papers reviewed identified some positive impact of active innovation policies on productivity (Aguiar and Gagnepain 2013; Grilli and Murtinu, 2012; Sissoko, 2013) , employment (Benavente et al 2007; Moretti and Wilson, 2013; Morris and Herrmann, 2013; Einiö, 2014) , or other measures of firm performance e.g., sales, turnover, profit (Nishimura and Okamuro, 2011; Jaffe and Le, 2015) . Moreover, the review concluded that programs emphasising public-private collaboration tend to perform better than those that exclusively support private firms and that only competitive subsidies have positive effects. Finally, the more general consolidated evidence is that evaluating the impact of R&D loans, subsidies and grants is extremely complex, even when individual programmes are relatively simple in terms of policy design and implementation. Only a limited number of impact evaluation studies can directly trace the full range of policy effects; none of them can attribute these effects to specific features of the corresponding programme. If the existing literature is far from unanimous on the impact of active innovation policies on a variety of measures of firm performance, solid evidence on the returns to the novel features introduce by the Smart Specialisation Strategy is non-existent. Large part of the existing empirical literature on Smart Specialisation has focused on the issue of engagement with business, government and civil society (Gianelle et al., 2017) , on the capacity of business and regional and local government to clearly prioritise needs and opportunities (Vivanco et al., 2016) , on patterns of regional diversification (Balland et al., 2016) and on the challenges to implementation in less developed regions (Lazzaretti and Innocenti, 2016) .
The magnitude of the financial resources mobilised by the Smart Specialisation strategy as well as its spatial and thematic extent make it particularly urgent to fill the substantial gap in the policy knowledge basis. If it too early for any credible counterfactual assessment of the impacts (and their conditioning factors) of Smart Specialisation measures, it is still possible to look into the copious experience accumulated over previous programming periods in order to identify suitable programmes anticipating (at least some of) the features of the 'new' programmes inspired by the Smart Specialisation approach. A policy learning exercise aimed at extrapolating out from a particular case in order to draw some (at least tentative) conclusions and guidance for ongoing-policies.
The Collaborative Industrial Research (CIR) Program
The in total) were funded subject to budget availability following their rank order. Given the available budget and the total funding requested by each project, only projects that received a score above 104.4 were in fact funded, whereas some eligible projects did not receive any funding due to the lack of sufficient funding (32 projects received no subsides, notwithstanding their eligibility granted by a score above 96). 143 large enterprises, 229
SMEs, 167 Micro Enterprises, 237 Universities and 161 research entities received funding.
The average value of the financed projects was roughly 9 million euro, with an average subsidy of roughly 6 million euro.
Funded projects were mandated to start the proposed activities as soon as possible following the announcement of the results and to conclude the entire project in a maximum of three years from the start date. In order to strictly enforce these requirements, projects could benefited from an upfront transfer of up to 75% of the total funding conditional on having started the project by October 30 th 2011. It is also important to stress that projects receiving funding under the CIR programme cannot receive any funding from any other source. This makes it possible to exclude a priori any additional confounding source of funding at the time of the application as well as for the entire duration of the project. Unfortunately, the same conditions do not apply to the projects that did not receive funding. In order to mitigate any confounding factor, we checked in the OpenCoesione 4 dataset whether firms applying for projects not financed received any other form of EU funding from 2012 onwards and we excluded from our analysis all firms that received other forms of funding. 
Data
All data related to the CIR are taken from its official database (named SIRIO). For each project the database includes the evaluation score as well as a wide set of characteristics, among which the tax code of the participating firms. The firms' tax code has allowed us to merge the CIR dataset with firm balance-sheet information from CERVED (a database with 4 OpenCoesione is the Italian governmental portal which collects data on all the single subsidies co-financed by EU money and those one financed by National resources in Italy. This represents the overwhelming majority of the subsidies available for firms located in convergence regions. 5 The control leads us to a reduction of 40 percent of the initial sample (we kept 1,172 observations of the 2,078 observations that we have by matching the CIR database with the CERVED database. The composition among treated -11 percent -and non-treated remains comparable). 
Empirical analysis and identification strategy
The empirical analysis aims to evaluate whether the receipt of CIR subsidies makes a difference to the firms' performance. As discussed above, subsidies were granted according to the scoring assigned by the independent evaluators: only the projects that received a score above the cutoff of 104.4 were actually funded. We exploit this discontinuity to investigate the causal impact of the CIR scheme on firm performance. In principle, projects ranked differently may differ in terms of many observed and unobserved characteristics that can be correlated with measures firm performance. For instance, highly scored projects might be of superior intrinsic quality and, therefore, they might not face any credit constraint that would prevent their implementation even in absence of the funding. By applying a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we are able to differentiate out all the characteristics of the projects that may confound the identification of the causal effect of the scheme. The key intuition behind this research design (Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Black, 1999; Van Der Klaauw, 2002 ) is that projects just below the cutoff (non-financed) make a suitable good comparisons group for those just above the cutoff (financed). This strategy is deemed preferable to other non-experimental methods because if the units of analysis are unable to manipulate precisely the forcing variable (the ranking), the variation in treatment around the threshold is randomised as if the projects had been randomly drawn just below or just above the threshold (see Lee, 2008) .
One implication of the local randomised result is that the empirical validity of the RDD can be empirically tested. If the variation in the treatment near the threshold is approximately randomised, it follows that all "baseline covariates" -those variables determined prior to the realisation of the forcing variable (the score) -should have about the same distribution just above and just below the cutoff. Section 6 presents a test for the absence of discontinuity in baseline characteristics around the threshold that substantiates the empirical strategy. The causal effect of the CIR is assessed by allowing the outcome variable to be a function of the score and testing the existence of a discontinuity in the intercept at the threshold. The forcing variable is centered at the cut-off value. In order not to impose any restrictions on the underlying conditional mean functions, the polynomial function of the centered score is interacted with the treatment dummy (Angrist and Pischke, 2011) . The specification is the following:
Where i is the firm; j is the project; t the time period (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) and the standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and clustered at the project level (Lee and Card, 2008) . In the main specification models are estimated by following Athey and Imbens (2016) i.e. within the optimal bandwidth and with the optimal polynomial degree (Calonico et al., 2014) . As for robustness checks purposes, models are estimated also with a global polynomial function of up to degree 3 with the AIC criterion selecting the best specification.
We also provide estimation results to check for the presence of heterogeneous impacts at the threshold. In this case (as in Becker at al., 2013 and Accetturo et al., 2014) , we will add to equation (1) an additional forcing variable (Z) that accounts for the conditioning aspect under investigation.
Note that while our identification strategy delivers a highly credible picture of the effect of the subsidy for the subpopulation of firms close to the threshold, for those further away, the RDD results may be less informative. This is unfortunate because in our case identification away of the cutoff is particularly relevant: policy makers might want to know what might have happened if firms with scores below the threshold would have gained access to the scheme; by the same token, they might wonder whether the public money spent for the firms that easily pass the admission threshold carry with it deadweight losses. To gain some insights in this regard, we make use of the Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) conditional independence assumption (CIA). CIA breaks the relationship between treatment status and outcomes by means of a vector of covariates such that, conditional on it, outcomes are (mean) independent of the running variable. The vector of covariates is then used to identify counterfactual values for the outcome variables of interest away from the cutoff.
Empirical findings
In this section we first document our baseline RDD results at the 104.4 cutoff.
Subsequently, we substantiate the validity of our RDD identification strategy by looking at manipulation, balancing and placebos. Next, we search for interesting asymmetries at the threshold, which might clarify the mechanisms at work. Finally, we provide the extrapolations away from the cutoff. Table 1 reports our baseline results. We consider three outcome variables: investment, value added and number of Employees. All of them are specified as logarithmic growth rate (over the 2011-2014 period) standardised with respect to the initial (2010) size of the balance sheet. 6 Our variable 'Investment' includes both tangible and intangible capital outlays, as the CIR does not discriminate between the two. We sum up all investments undertaken by each firm. Estimates are derived from a nonparametric estimator, where the optimal bandwidth and the polynomial degree according to which the models are estimated are selected by the routine robust (Calonico et al., 2014; Athey and Imbens, 2016) . The results reported in the table suggest that the impact at the threshold is negative and generally not significant (borderline statistical significance is found for Value Added).
Baseline
As a preliminary robustness check, we want to verify that these results continue to hold for different specifications. Table 2 reports those from parametric (global higher order polynomial approximations) regressions. The impact at the threshold is estimated by considering the forcing variable with the degree of polynomial (f) allowed to vary differently on the two sides of the threshold, interacted with the treatment dummy and selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC suggests that the best degree of the polynomial approximations are (1-1), (3-1), and (3-1), respectively for the three outcomes. These additional results confirm those reported in Table 1 , with a non-significant impact of the CIR for all outcomes. Figure 1 illustrates the classical RDD figure for the outcome Investment in the AIC preferred specification, where the threshold is normalised to zero for convenience.
Testing the validity of the identification framework
The RDD framework relies on the fact that firms cannot manipulate their ranking in order to get funding. In our case this requirement seems to be trivially verified, as the score is assigned by the panel of independent experts. In any case, we investigate the smoothness of our forcing variable (the score) around the threshold. Figure 2 plots the density of firms (using bin sizes equal to 10). A visual inspection shows no increase in the probability mass after the threshold. At any rate, the hypothesis of non-random sorting around the cutoff is rejected on the basis of the test developed by McCrary (2008) .
To test the assumption that the assignment of the treatment near the cutoff is approximately randomised, we examine whether the observed baseline covariates are locally balanced on either side of the cutoff. The regression discontinuity framework provides a natural framework to check whether some confounding factor is driving some spurious correlation. It suffices to run RDD regressions (of the type in equation (1)) using as dependent variables those factors that the researcher suspects might be driving the results. If no effect is detected then that variable can be considered as controlled for in the RDD exercise. We focus on a long list of firm and project characteristics: from balance sheet data we focus on tangible and intangible capital, indicators of cash flow and of the liability side of the balance sheet, which proxy for credit constraints, traditional proxies for profitability, labor and service costs and the number of employees (from INPS). We test also the project and firm features that capture the S3 elements, such as the nature and the dimension of the project's partnership (presence of a University, number of the subjects collaborating), the activity of the project, the economic sectors of the firms, its innovative capacities and its internationalisation. These variables will be used below to check for heterogeneous effects at the threshold. The results (which are derived from the same specification as in Table 1 ) are shown in Table 3 . No jump occurs at the threshold for most of the baseline covariates.
Exceptions refer to the Return On Assets (ROA). As explained by Lee and Lemieux (2010) 
Heterogeneity at the threshold
We move next to check whether our results at the border show any discernable asymmetries. In particular we are interested in the S3 forerunner characteristics of CIR. Table   5 shows the results obtained by estimating equation (2) with reference to six additional forcing variables, those indexed by Zk (with k from 1 to 6). Preliminarily, it should be noted that the variables Zk are continuous at the 104.4 threshold, as shown in Table 3 . Therefore the estimation of Eq. (2) is a feasible exercise (Becker et al., 2013 and Accetturo et al., 2014) . It is worth noticing, that the findings reported in Table 5 should be interpreted with care, as the additional forcing variables Zk might be cross-correlated. Moreover, some of them might be endogenous to the scheme. For instance, knowing that the inclusion of an academic partner raises the CIR score, might have induced participants to include universities in their applications in order to maximise their probability of receiving the grants, with limited interest in actual collaborations.
The investigation of the CIR mechanisms that more directly anticipated some of the features of the programmes inspired by the S3 approach leads to the following evidence. The presence of a University (Z1) in the application seems to have had a positive effect (marginally significant) on employment levels. On the other hand, collaboration (Z2) per se does not seem to add to the overall impact of the scheme. On average, the projects that included a large number of firms (i.e. projects with more than 13 partners among firms and Universities) perform relatively worse (the negative interactions enter highly significantly when the outcomes are Value Added and Employment). As for the innovative nature of the activities supported by the scheme, we consider those that can be classified as advanced in terms of knowledge intensity and technological capabilities. In particular, we identify CIR projects in the activity areas: ICT, Advanced materials, Health and biotechnologies and Aerospace and aeronautics (Z3). We do not find that these projects use funds more effectively, compared to other -more traditional -areas of activity (i.e. Energy and energy reduction, Agro-industrial system, Cultural heritage, Transport and advanced logistics, Environment and safety).
Looking at the characteristics of the beneficiary firms, the empirical evidence suggests that the scheme has benefited relatively more firms operating in low tech sectors (Z4) (as to the Eurostat/OECD classifications 8 ). These firms are those facing stronger constraints in terms of access to credit as well as those for which collaboration with more innovative counterparts might offer the highest returns. The results for firms with a high ex-ante patenting track record (Z5) are instead less straightforward: the impact on investment is negative and highly significant, while Value Added seems to have been positively influenced by the subsidies. This evidence is probably capturing the life-cycle of innovative activities:
firms can take full advantage of CIR incentives in terms of innovation output (measured by value added) when their stock of knowledge (existing patents) is already formed. In this case, CIR incentives are used to capitalise on the potential of previous investments (by increasing sales, for instance) rather than to support further investment. Finally, program effectiveness has been limited for multinational corporations (Z6), suggesting that to in order to maximise returns to innovative investment S3 programmes would need to find the right approach to take into account the specificities of these firms and mobilise their potential. Even if domestic/small medium enterprises (SMEs) can certainly play an important role in innovation processes the key innovation players remain large and often multinational firms.
Far-from-the-threshold extrapolations
The results discussed so far are valid only for firms very close to the funding cutoff.
By using the Angrist and Rokkanen (2015)'s CIA we are able to analyses the impact of the CIR far from the threshold. This is equivalent to explore what might have happened with a more stringent (or more generous) funding threshold. As discussed in Section. 5, the possibility to extrapolate the impact of CIR for firms distant from the cutoff relies on breaking the relationship between treatment status and outcomes by means of a vector of covariates such that, conditional on it, outcomes are (mean) independent of the running variable.
To ensure that the relationship between the running variable and the outcomes has been removed, we run for each outcome CIA tests from estimation windows of various width.
The CIA test come from models that control for Tangible Table 6 ). Therefore, limited to Employment we are able to provide far-from-the-threshold inference for up to the 30% of the observations in our sample.
The results suggest that a more (or less) generous level funding of the scheme would have not affected programme effectiveness. The CIA extrapolations for employment on the right of the cutoff are depicted in Figure 3 .
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of CIR -a programme designed to foster The results suggest that the impact of CIR on firm performance has been limited in terms of additional investments, value added and employment. This first key insight calls for a cautious approach to the reform of innovation policies. The simultaneous introduction of new features, conditionalities and requirements in innovation programmes might be a risky choice. A gradual and evidence-based approach to policy reforms might be the best approach until robust evidence is produced on the impact and value added of alternative policy options.
The analysis of the influence of specific features of CIR that might be relevant to the implementation of 'new generation' programmes inspired by the S3 approach unveiled a number of relevant insights on how to improve the performance of existing schemes.
Collaboration is an increasingly important feature of all innovative activities and S3 has created the pre-conditions for the development of policy tools aimed at the reinforcing the collaborative dimension of innovation policies. However, Therefore, the collaborative dimension of S3 projects should not be a requirement to be 'rewarded' as such but should supported only where a clear rationale is provided in light of the specific technological problem that the applicant intend to solve.
The pre-selection of high knowledge intensity areas of activity has also failed to deliver the intended benefits when compared to more traditional technological domains.
Again this calls for a broad approach to innovation policies to be based on careful diagnoses The complexity of the scheme with its collaborative requirements -by increasing transaction and coordination costs -reduces the returns for complex internally diversified organisations.
In light of this evidence the mobilisation of larger firms remains a challenge for current and future S3 strategies that should be carefully considered.
These findings provide some initial evidence-based insights to inform and reinforce the debate on the S3 approach and its future post-2020, within the informative boundaries Notes: Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the project level. Estimates derived with the optimal bandwidth and the polynomial degree selected by the routine robust (Calonico et al., 2014) . Significance level: ***<0.001; **<0.010; *<0.050. Notes: Same specification as in Table (1) . Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the project level. Significance level: ***<0.001; **<0.010; *<0.050. The objective is to make the Convergence regions (Puglia, Sicily, Calabria and Campania) more competitive by promoting the sustainable development of these areas, diversifying production specialisation and strengthening sectors of excellence. A decisive factor in the selection of the projects was the demonstration of how the implementation and development of these enabling technologies would improve industry competitiveness and quality of life.
Tables
Projects could have been presented for 9 scientific and technological areas, which the CIR believed to be strategic. This is the complete list:
1) ICT;
2) Advanced materials;
3) Energy and energy saving; 
